



BIBLIOPOLIS
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ABSTRACT ELENCHOS 2013/2

STUDI E SAGGI

DENIS O'BRIEN

THE PARADOX OF CHANGE IN PLATO'S *THEAETETUS*. PART II. INTRICACIES OF SYNTAX AND MEANING (154E7-155C7)

Abstract

Plato's paradox of relative change in size and number (154e7-155c7) cannot be understood unless the text is emended (see Part I of this article) and unless full weight is given to shifts of mood and tense and to the play of particles. The critical reader will also need to adapt to a non-Fregean concept of equality and to a definition of change different from Geach's definition of "Cambridge change". Only so will the structure of the paradox explain young Theaetetus' bewilderment, while also showing that the author of the dialogue was not himself a victim of the paradox he has created.

Keywords

Plato, *Theaetetus*, negation, mood and tense, responsory particles, $\alpha\lambda\lambda\alpha\upsilon$ "postpositum", "Cambridge change", paradox, ambiguity

JIE TIAN

ELEMENTS AND KNOWLEDGE IN THE *THEAETETUS*

Abstract

Plato's *Theaetetus* develops an inquiry concerning the definition of knowledge. Famously, after Socrates and Theaetetus have discussed the three candidates for the definition of knowledge, the end of the dialogue seems to leave us in a situation of aporia. The present article focuses on the last hypothesis raised in the dialogue and tries to determine whether this hypothesis can be seen, under appropriate qualification, as acceptable within a Platonic framework. This hypothesis is connected with a dream theory that unfolds two crucial factors to understanding the definition of knowledge, i.e. elements and *logos*. So the aim of this paper is twofold: on the one hand, to make clear what elements properly are; on the other hand to find an account of *logos* suitable to make it a necessary condition for the definition of knowledge. As will emerge from this paper, the first two candidates for the definition of knowledge are indeed not sufficient for gaining an adequate definition, but they nonetheless foreshadow the third hypothesis and are necessary conditions for understanding the third one.

Keywords

Plato, *Theaetetus*, Socrates, dream theory, elements, knowledge, *logos*

MAURO BONAZZI

CONCEZIONI STOICHE E IDEE PLATONICHE

Abstract

Aim of this paper is to show how Middle Platonist philosophers adapted Stoic epistemology to their own Platonist metaphysics. More precisely the discussion focuses on the key notion of *ennoia* (conception). Middle Platonists argue against the hypothesis that conceptions have an empirical origin and claim that an *ennoia* is what remains of the pre-natal vision of the ideas. According to them, it is only through metaphysics that a theory of knowledge can adequately be grounded. The second part of the paper delves into the limits of such a claim. The possibility of getting a proper knowledge of the ideas raises a problem, for if the *ennoiai* are grounded on the ideas, but the ideas are not object of a proper knowledge, we run the risk of not having a proper criterion anymore. On these grounds, we would not be able to account for the process of knowledge.

Keywords

Middle Platonism, Platonist epistemology, Plato's theory of ideas, *ennoia*, Stoic epistemology

MARIA CARMEN DE VITA

GIULIANO E IL MEDIOPLATONISMO: IL CASO DI PLUTARCO

Abstract

This article aims to show that Julian the Emperor had some knowledge of Middle Platonic doctrines. More specifically, the discussion focuses on the case of Plutarch of Chaeronea. We can find interesting parallels between the works of this philosopher and the *Orations* of Julian, especially concerning the allegorical exegesis of myths, the crucial metaphysical role played by Apollo-Helios and the doctrine of the soul. It is worth considering the possibility that Plutarch's works partially inspired Julian's concept of Hellenism.

Keywords

Julian the Emperor, Plutarch, Middle Platonism, allegory, Helios, soul, Hellenism

DISCUSSIONI, NOTE E RASSEGNE

MENICO CAROLI

CIRCOLAZIONE E VENDITA DELLA *SYNGRAPHE* DI ANASSAGORA

(PLAT. *APOL.* 26D-E)

Abstract

The price ("a drachma at most") at which a copy of Anaxagoras' *Suggraphhis* sold, in Plat. *Apol.* 26d-e, is problematic in its real meaning. The difficulty of fixing an overall picture is determined by the fragmentation of the arguments in dozens of commentaries *ad loc.* First of all, it is necessary to take into account variables (essential for a correct interpretation of this price), such as the cost of the papyrus, especially in epigraphical evidence relating to different moments of Greek economy, and alternative forms of *ktēsi* bibliōn.

Keywords

Anaxagoras, book trade, cost of the papyrus, Plato, *Apology*

FRANCO FERRARI

L'INTERPRETAZIONE DEL *TEETETO* E LA NATURA DELLA EPISTEMOLOGIA
PLATONICA. ALCUNE OSSERVAZIONI

Abstract

This article replies to the critical note by Trabattoni («Elenchos», xxxiii (2012) pp. 69-107). The author defends his interpretation of Plato's *Theaetetus* against Trabattoni's objections, arguing that the maieutic and peirastic character of the dialogue explains its negative or aporetic conclusion. For the failure of all the attempts to define knowledge in the dialogue doesn't mean that, according to Plato, knowledge is not possible for men or that it can be identified with *doxa*; on the contrary, Plato clearly states that the philosopher, i.e. the dialectician, is absolutely able to attain the perfect knowledge of the forms. The subsequent failures in the *Theaetetus*, particularly the last two, depend on the admission of an "additive model" according to which knowledge is "*doxa plus something*", an epistemological attitude that is explicitly rejected in the *Meno*.

Keywords

Plato, *Theaetetus*, maieutic, aporia, knowledge