

ABSTRACTS
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STUDIE SAGGI

TOMÁŠ VÍTEK

LE *SPHAIROS* D'EMPÉDOCLE ET SON SUBSTRAT MYTHOLOGIQUE

Abstract

The intention of this paper is at least partly to reveal the background and the sources that inspired or could have inspired the Empedoclean conception of *Sphairos*. These sources have mostly been sought in the philosophical constructions of other pre-Socratics (predominantly in Parmenides and Xenophanes) but the present paper aims to show that there are very interesting and sometimes also very narrow parallels and analogies in mythology. On the one hand, in the stories of the primordial man (*Urmensch*) who is sacrificed in the world and whose torn limbs created parts or elements of our world (narratives of this kind are well attested throughout the world), and on the other hand, in the myth of the periodical death and resurrection of Adonis. While the inspiration with the destiny of Aphrodite's lover Adonis seems to be highly probable, whether Empedocles knew and utilized the myth of dismemberment of the primordial man remains unclear. The idea of *Sphairos*, in every case, was formed by dint of both genres or ways of thinking – philosophical as well as mythological ones – that both permeated all his verses (i.e. both *Peri phuseos* and *Katharmoi*).

Keywords

Empedocles, Sphairos, mythos, Adonis, Urmensch

RAFAEL FERBER

PLATO'S "SIDE SUNS": BEAUTY, SYMMETRY AND TRUTH. COMMENTS CONCERNING SEMANTIC MONISM AND PLURALISM OF THE "GOOD" IN THE *PHILEBUS* (65 A 1-5)

Abstract

Under semantic monism I understand the thesis "The Good is said in one way" and under semantic pluralism the antithesis "The Good is said in many ways". Plato's Socrates seems to defend a "semantic monism". As only one sun exists, so the "Good" has for Socrates and Plato only one reference. Nevertheless, Socrates defends in the *Philebus* a semantic pluralism, more exactly trilateralism, of "beauty, symmetry and truth" (*Phil.* 65 A 2). Therefore, metaphorically speaking, there seem to exist not only one sun, but three suns. If the platonic Socrates defends a semantic monism on the one hand and pluralism on the other, how can we unite his pluralism with his monism? My thesis is that the *three* references are "qualities" (*poia*) (cfr. *ep.* VII 343 B 8-C 2) of the *one* single reference, or again, speaking metaphorically, "side suns" (*Nebensonnen*) of the single sun. In the following, I propose first an exegesis of Plato's last written word on the Good in *Phil.* 65 A 1-5 by dividing it into five sentences. Second, I ask a philosophical question on this monism and the corresponding hierarchy of values (*Phil.* 66 A 6-C 6).

Keywords

Sun and side-suns, semantic monism and semantic pluralism, symmetry, beauty and truth, fact of oppression

ELENA IRRERA

STRIVING FOR CONTEMPLATION. *TRUE* POLITICIANS VS *GOOD* POLITICIANS IN ARISTOTLE'S PHILOSOPHY

Abstract

In this paper I will argue that, in Aristotle's thought, the political commitment of authentically wise men is ultimately motivated by an intellectual rather than by a merely practical interest. Through

analysis of *Eudemian Ethics* A 4. 1216 a 23-7 and Θ 3. 1248 b 8-37 I shall contend that the so-called “true politician” is to be identified with a *kalos kai agathos* man, i.e. with an individual who – rather than being driven by mere desire for the promotion of the common good – acts in the ultimate analysis out of a deep concern for the inherent worth of moral virtue. I shall propose that, while acting “for the sake of the fine”, the true politician aims not only to reach an appreciation of moral virtue independent of the possible benefits this can bring about, but also to maximize contemplative activity within the political sphere. After a preliminary introduction to the issue of true statesmanship, I try to understand in what respect the good (*to agathon*) differs from the fine (*to kalon*), and I shall offer an account of the relationships between the two notions at issue by reference to their occurrences in the *Eudemian Ethics* and in the *Metaphysics*. I will suggest that the fine, if predicated of the practical good, expresses its intelligibility and liability to contemplation. In the second part I concentrate on the issue of *kalokagathia* (“moral fineness”) and enquire into *to kalon* from the point of view of the lawgiver’s intentions and motives of virtuous action.

Keywords

Aristotle, beauty, contemplation, true, politician

DISCUSSIONI, NOTE E RASSEGNE

TIZIANO DORANDI

CONSIDERAZIONI DI UN EDITORE LAERZIANO IN MARGINE AL TESTO DI UN FRAMMENTO DI ERACLITO (B 45 D.-K. = 67 MARCOV.)

Abstract

Some thoughts on the text of a fragment of Heraclitus preserved by Diogenes Laertius IX 7. The editor of Diogenes’ *Lives* must follow BP manuscripts and write ψυχῆς πείρατα τῶν οὐκ ἂν ἐξεύροιο κτλ.

Keywords

Heraclitus, Diogenes Laertius’ manuscripts, Tertullian

JAAP MANSFELD

HERACLITUS FR. 22 B 45 D.-K. A CONJECTURE

Abstract

οὐκ ἂν ἐξεύροιο in the text of a Heraclitean quotation at Diog. Laert. IX 7 paraphrases the genuine οὐκ ἐξευρήσει.

Keywords

Heraclitus, Diogenes Laertius, second/third person, *Buchstabenphilologie*

ELENA GRITTI-CHRISTOPH RIEDWEG

ECHI DAL *TIMEO* NELLE APORIE SULL’IMPASSIBILITÀ DELL’ANIMA IN *ENNEADI* III 6, 1-5. FRUTTI DI UNA *SYNOUSIA* PLOTINIANA

Abstract

Through new references, both conceptual and lexical, to the *Timaeus*, concerning in particular the problematic connection between human soul and body, this paper aims to show how pervasive a role Plato’s ideas play in the *aporiai* Plotinus raises about the soul’s impassibility when facing perceptions and affections. But if the *Timaeus* looms large not only in the second part of *Ennead* III 6 on matter where the influence of this dialogue is undisputed, but already in the first five chapters, the treatise as a whole would turn out to be much more coherent than previously assumed.

Keywords

Plato, Plotinus, exegesis of the *Timaeus*, soul and body, affections