

ABSTRACTS ELENCHOS 2012/2  
STUDI E SAGGI

MATYÁŠ HAVRDA

CATEGORIES IN *STROMATA* VIII

*Abstract*

The article is an analysis of a chapter dealing with the Aristotelian categories in the so-called eighth book of *Stromata* by Clement of Alexandria, a collection of notes from a philosophical source (or sources) concerned with the theory of demonstration and related issues. Though seldom mentioned in contemporary scholarship, this short chapter is a valuable testimony of the reception of the *Categories* in the philosophy of the Imperial period and before the time of Alexander of Aphrodisias. After a brief survey of its contents, the article investigates parallels in philosophical literature and explores the function of the chapter within the larger context of *Stromata* VIII. In the final section the question of Clement's source is addressed. Drawing on earlier research concerning other parts of the eighth book, the article argues that in this case, too, Galen's lost writing on demonstration is a likely candidate.

*Keywords*

*Stromata* VIII, categories, forms, homonyms, Aspasius, Galen

FILIP KARFIK

LE TEMPS ET L'ÂME CHEZ PLOTIN. A PROPOS DES *ENNEADES* VI 5 [23] 11; IV 4 [28] 15-16; III 7 [45] 11

*Abstract*

There is a remarkable difference between the accounts of time in Plotinus' *Enneads* VI 5 [23] 11, IV 4 [28] 15-16 and III 7 [45] 11. In VI 5 [23] 11, Plotinus does not introduce time into soul, nor into a part or power of it because he holds that soul belongs to the sort of being which has no extension, spatial or temporal. In IV 4 [28] 15-16, he considers the thesis that time, in its very existence, is linked to the soul but he rejects the idea that there is time in the World Soul. In III 7 [45] 11, however, he affirms that time exists only in soul, more precisely in a part or power of it, and suggests that it is first and foremost the World Soul that makes itself temporal. It seems that Plotinus' philosophy of time developed during the years. From the emphasis laid on the thesis that soul has no spatial extension, characteristic of his earlier writings, Plotinus' interest shifted gradually to the question whether or not it has a temporal extension. He also seems to have changed his mind on the question of the temporality of the World Soul. Finally, while speaking, III 7 [45] 11, of the soul's making itself temporal, he apparently contends that just a specific part or power of soul – be it the World Soul or the human soul – is doing so.

*Keywords*

Plotinus, time, extension, soul, parts of soul

JAN OPSOMER

SELF-MOTION ACCORDING TO IAMBlichUS

*Abstract*

Iamblichus' theory of self-motion has to be pieced together from various texts and passing remarks. Ever since Aristotle's critique, Plato's concept of the self-motive soul was felt to be problematic. Taking his lead from Plotinus, Iamblichus counters Aristotle's criticism by claiming that true self-motion transcends the opposition between activity and passivity. He moreover argues that it does not involve motion that is spatially extended. Hence it is non-physical. Primary self-motion is the reversion of the soul to itself, by which the soul constitutes itself, i.e. imparts life to itself. This motion is located at the level of essence or substance. The bestowal of life upon the body derives

from this fundamental motion. As a result, animals are derivatively self-motive. Secondary self-motions are acts of thought in the broad sense. Contrary to the unmoved motion of intellect, the self-motion of the soul is not beyond time. This somehow fits Iamblichus' theory of the "changing self". Iamblichus anticipates much of the later Platonic accounts of self-motion.

*Keywords*

Self-motion, soul, Aristotle's criticism of Plato, *Laws*, *Phaedrus*

MARWAN RASHED

NOUVEAU FRAGMENT ARABE DU *DE AETERNITATE MUNDI CONTRA ARISTOTELEM* DE JEAN PHILOPON

*Abstract*

This paper presents a new fragment of Philoponus' treatise *De aeternitate mundi contra Aristotelem*. The fragment, preserved only in an Arabic translation by al-Bīrūnī, derives in all probability from the third book of the treatise, and it deals with the moonstone or selenite. It is hypothesized that this mirabile, which is described by Damascius in his *Life of Isidore*, was deployed by Philoponus at the point of his polemic against Aristotle.

*Keywords*

al-Bīrūnī, John Philoponus, Neoplatonism, eternity of the world, *mirabilia*, moonstone/selenite

#### DISCUSSIONI, NOTE E RASSEGNE

DENIS O'BRIEN

EMPEDOCLES' "MOUNTAIN PATH" (FR. 24)

*Abstract*

Empedocles' fr. 24 is known only from its quotation by Plutarch. The words as quoted leave themselves open to divergent interpretations. The context in Plutarch nonetheless holds out some hope of being able to decide which of the divergent interpretations would have matched the use that Empedocles himself made of the two verses in his poem.

*Keywords*

*Daimones*, oracles, providence, Plutarch, Cleombrotus

FRANCESCA PENTASSUGLIO

DUPLICE AFRODITE, DUPLICE *EROS*: UN CASO DI INTERTESTUALITÀ NEI *SIMPOSI* SOCRATICI

*Abstract*

The paper deals with one of the most striking intertextual relations between Xenophon's and Plato's *Symposium*: the fundamental axiological distinction between *Pandemos* ἔρως and *Ouranos* ἔρως, which Xenophon's Socrates outlines in VIII 9-10 and Pausanias points out in 180 D-181 E. After briefly discussing the issue of the chronological order of both works, the analysis focuses especially on the function and the meaning of such a distinction in Xenophon's *Symposium*, particularly in the light of the intricate network of references binding Socrates' speech to Pausanias' one. Furthermore, the investigation includes a comparison between the *Symposium* by Xenophon and that by Plato as far as the double nature of Afrodites and ἔρως is concerned. In the conclusion, general considerations are drawn about the complex strategy pursued by Xenophon in the use of platonic source.

*Keywords*

*Symposium*, socratic *eros*, male love, Plato, Xenophon