MIKOLAJ DOMARADZKI
THEAGENES OF RHEGIUM AND THE RISE OF ALLEGORICAL INTERPRETATION

Abstract
The present paper investigates the pivotal role that Theagenes of Rhegium came to play in the development of ancient allegoresis. The main thesis of the article has it that the thinker’s resorting to allegorical interpretation was, at least to some extent, prompted by the emergence and flourishing of the Ionian philosophy. Consequently, it is argued here that Theagenes’ hermeneutical activity aimed not only to exonerate Homer from the charges of impiety but also to make use of his authority so as to promote the novel doctrines of the Milesian philosophers. While Theagenes himself did not present a rational account of the world that could be compared to the work of Thales and his successors, Theagenes’ allegoresis seems to have been an important transitional stage in the complex process of the philosophical transformation of mythos into logos. Thus, although Theagenes’ practice of reading scientific ideas into Homer may at times seem strained, arbitrary, far-fetched and even preposterous, the naïveté of the first exegetical efforts should not cloud their cultural import, for it is owing to such daring attempts as those of Theagenes that Hellenic thought eventually paved the way for modern hermeneutics.

Keywords
Theagenes of Rhegium, allegorical interpretation, Homer, Anaximander, Anaximenes, Milesian philosophy

FEDERICO M. PETRUCCI
OPINIONE CORRETTA, CONOSCENZA, VIRTÙ: SU MENONE 96 D 1-98 B 9

Abstract
The well known epistemological section of the Meno (96 D 1-98 B 9) represents a crux for scholars. Interpretations aiming to demonstrate the proximity of belief and knowledge have been refuted by referring to other Platonic passages, where a clear-cut distinction between belief and knowledge can be found. The present paper provides a running analysis of this section and aims to show that: 1) the analogy of the way to Larisa is a dialectical argument, which does not express Plato’s epistemological view; 2) the αἵτις λογισμός-argument displays, instead, Plato’s genuine position on the issue. It entails a substantial distinction between belief and knowledge, a distinction grounded on their different objects. This epistemological conclusion suggests that an important distinction is present between the two kinds of virtue set out in this dialogue: while (a) true virtue is grounded on knowledge and belongs to “being virtuous”, (b) a virtue of second degree is grounded on true belief and belongs to “doing virtuous actions”.

Keywords
Plato’s epistemology, Meno, belief, knowledge, virtue

THOMAS AUFFRET
ARISTOTE, MÉTAPHYSIQUE A 1-2: UN TEXTE “ÉMINEMMENT PLATONICIEN”?

Abstract
Based on the study of two polemical allusions to platonic dialogues in the first two chapters of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, the present article aims at showing that they both introduce to the sharp
criticism of Plato’s theory of Ideas which Aristotle develops at length in the later part of Book A. Indeed, both references to Republic II 379 C-D and Gorgias 448 C, while being very allusive, betray a clearly ironic tone and reveal how polemical Aristotle’s purpose is when he quotes Plato in these pages. A new interpretation of the opening of Book A is thus proposed: this paper suggests that, far from being an “outstandingly platonist” text despite of its being deeply imbued with platonic references, the very beginning of Aristotle’s Metaphysics already conveys subtle but systematic critics against Plato, which derives precisely from Aristotle’s peculiar use of platonic references. Finally, on the ground of textual details related to the main subject of this paper, a hypothesis is made regarding the role of platonic circles in the ancient transmission of Aristotle’s Metaphysics.

Keywords
Metaphysics, Plato, anti-Platonism, causality, textual tradition of Aristotle

CHRISTOPHER I. BECKWITH
PYRRHO’S LOGIC: A RE-EXAMINATION OF ARISTOCLES’ RECORD OF TIMON’S ACCOUNT
Abstract
The major recent interpretations of Pyrrho’s philosophy are reviewed and their radical differences considered to be due to difficulties in the most important single ancient testimony, the account of Timon recorded by Aristocles, quoted in Eusebius. The text is analyzed closely in the context of the other testimonies. Several problematic issues are resolved, including the putative “zany inference” and the apparent mention of aphasia. It is shown that the text actually gives a far more accurate presentation of Pyrrho’s views than previously believed, and that Pyrrho’s innovative philosophy is coherent, internally logical, and consistently ethical.

Keywords
Pyrrho, Timon, Aristocles, Greek scepticism, differentia, aphasia

WOLDEMAR GÖRLER
CICERO, DE FINIBUS BONORUM ET MALORUM, BUCH 5. BEOBACHTUNGEN ZUR QUELLE UND ZUM AUFBAU
Abstract
Three (partly interrelated) topics are discussed:
1. Cicero’s “source” for the bulk of De finibus 5 is Antiochus of Ascalon. This follows unequivocally from Cicero’s indication at the beginning (8) and at the end (75); it is not contradicted by the passing reference to Theophrastus (12): new linguistic evidence proves that Theophrastum adhibeamus ad pleraque, still taken by some as a clear nomination of source, does not mean “employ” but simply “admit” (besides others). The rest of the book is of Cicero’s own making (see below).
2. Section 46 appears to be a main axis of the book: adhuc quidem [...] nunc autem alius iam argumentandi sequamur genus ... Central object of book 5 (as of books 1 and 3) is to establish ethical norms. Up to the “axis” the argumentation had been subjective: enumerating inborn needs and desires of the human individual. Antiochus is aware that this will not do. That is why he, from 46 onwards, emphasizes that what is willed “naturally” by the individual is of objective value as well. Ethical conflicts may arise as natural values differ widely in rank, e.g. corporal and external “goods” often have to be neglected in favour of “goods of the soul”, i.e. virtue. Basically, the “axis” of 46 marks a transition from description to prescription – an ingenious attempt to dodge, ante litteram, Hume’s Law. It does not succeed. To prove his theory, Antiochus adduces a host of instances where in fact “lower goods” are sacrificed to realize intellectual and moral values –
examples, in Antiochus’ view, undisputable and self-evident. But appealing to self-evidence is description, once more, and so the argumentation is circular.

3. Cicero’s own contribution is most palpable in the final part (sections 75-96). Antiochus’ view (allegedly Peripatetic) is contrasted with other Peripatetics. All agree in that to obtain a “happy life” (vita beata) all three classes of “goods” (corporal, external, goods of the soul) are indispensable. But they differ in assessing the relative importance of the three classes: from the “low”, “cowardly” position of Theophrastus, attributing “much” to the lower goods, to the more moderate Staseas, and finally to Antiochus (as exposed by Piso) who minimizes the import of body and external wealth, closely approaching the Stoic tenet of the autarchy of virtue. Such a scale of “lower” and “higher” views is typical of Cicero’s personal thought, and so is the insistent appeal to obtain and to defend the “most courageous” positions. My suggestion is that Staseas and Theophrastus figure in De finibus 5 for no other reason than to make the hierarchy more substantial.

Keywords
Is-ought-problem, Hume’s Law, Naturalistic fallacy, Self evidence, Cradle argument, Maslow’s hierarchy of needs