



BIBLIOPOLIS

ELENCHOS 2013/1

STUDI E SAGGI

RAFAEL FERBER «WAS JEDE SEELE SUCHT UND WorumWILLEN SIE ALLES TUT»

Abstract

The article first (I) gives an exegesis of the famous passage in the *Republic*, 505d11-506a2. Attention is drawn to the fact that the principle that every soul does everything for the Good (*panta pratei*) can be translated in two ways: Every soul does everything for the sake of the Good, or goes to all lengths for the sake of the Good. Depending on the different translations, we have a different picture of the platonic Socrates in the *Republic*, an intellectualistic Socrates for whom irrational desires do not exist, or a Socrates who also accepts irrational desires. The article favours the first one. Then it (II) attempts to show that we can elucidate some dark points in the Socratic thesis that the Good is what every soul pursues and for which every soul does everything, with the help of Aquinas's distinction between *actio hominis* and *actio humana*. Finally, the article (III) outlines three substantive answers to the question "What is the Good?" – the henological, the perfectionist and the structuralist – and shows that these three answers lead into a trilemma. Instead of advancing a new answer, the article suggests an uncontroversial formal starting point for an answer to this question.

Keywords

Idea of the Good, divining, *actio hominis*, *actio humana*, the Third

DENIS O'BRIEN THE PARADOX OF CHANGE IN PLATO'S *THEAETETUS*.

PART I. AN EMENDATION OF THE TEXT (155B1-2) AND THE ORIGIN OF ERROR

Abstract

The text of *Theaetetus* 155b1-2 as recorded in the manuscripts and printed in current editions of the dialogue is marked by a syntactical anomaly (αἰσθησιμὸν ἀποσπαστικῶς) and a logical *non sequitur* (arbitrary transition from a copulative to an existential use of εἶηαι and *vice versa*). Attempts at emendation by Proclus, Stephanus and Campbell have all been unsuccessful. To find the way back to Plato's original text, the reader will have to fight his way through a logical tangle (the result of a double negation) and abandon the modish, but erroneous, belief that there is no difference in ancient Greek between "complete" and "incomplete" uses of εἶηαι.

Keywords

Change, size, relation, copulative and existential εἶηαι, Proclus, Stephanus, Campbell

FRANCESCA ALESSE LA PRESCRIZIONE NELL'ETICA STOICA. UN RIESAME

Abstract

The article aims at clarifying the Stoic theory of "prescription", more specifically, the Stoic reflection about the method to formulate rules and directions for moral conduct. First, the possibility to provide particular precepts is considered in the frame of some major doctrines such as the equivalence between moral end and conformity to nature, the theory of the "indifferents", the partition of actions into *katorthomata* and *kathekonta*. Accordingly, both internal Stoic debate on the real value of particular precepts, and Hermagoras' classification of *zetemata*, are considered in order to bring up the impact of early Stoic prescriptive theory on late Hellenistic ethics. Special attention is paid to Seneca's evidence from *Epistles* 94 and 95 – in their relation to Hermagoras' teachings – , and Plutarch's text from *De Stoic. rep.*, ch. 11, with regard to Chrysippus' theory of prescription.

Keywords

Stoicism, ethics, rules, prescription, Hermagoras

CLAUDIA MAGGI L' APOSTASIA DEL MOLTEPLICE NEL TRATTATO *SUI NUMERI* DI PLOTINO

Abstract

The Treatise *On Numbers* develops a typical Plotinian inquiry about oneness and intelligible plurality, in which the analysis is based on the problem of the infinite inside the intelligible realm, as it seems to be presented in the so-called generation of numbers in Plato's *Parmenides*, where numbers are linked to Being, identified by Plotinus with the hypostasis of Intellect, and produce a process of unlimited division. In order to avoid this interpretation, Plotinus finds in other Plato's dialogues the proof that number is an eidetic nature, encompassing all the intelligible entities, so that the infinite has to be interpreted as what is produced by calculus. Other arguments are rather depending on the model of the Old Academy, concerning the relationship between forms and numbers: Plotinus wonders if numbers come ontologically before forms and indeed he states right this position. Other aspects of Plotinus' investigation, which can be traced back to the Old Academy, are the distinction between two kinds of numbers and the doctrine of the unified number. This model of number, quite ambiguous, may be identified with the indefinite dyad, even though the former has to be conceived, differently from that of Old Academy, within a mono-polar framework, according to which the sole principle is the One.

Keywords

Indefinite dyad, intellect, ideal numbers, intermediates, soul

DISCUSSIONI, NOTE E RASSEGNE

FRANCESCA GUADALUPE MASI

LE CAUSE DELLA FORTUNA: UN' APORIA. ARISTOTELE, *FISICA* B 5.197A20-25

Abstract

In this paper I will examine a difficulty (*aporia*), which Aristotle raises in *Physics*, B 5.197a20-25: whether fortuitous things can be held as causes of luck. I will show the meaning of the passage and its relevance within the context of Aristotelian extended analysis of the notions of "luck" and "chance". I will claim that, in facing the problem, Aristotle has a twofold aim. Firstly, he wants to explain *why* luck is, after having enquired *whether it exists* and *what it is*. Secondly, he wants to prevent his pupils, among others, from denying causal efficacy to luck, by reducing fortuitous events, that are the result of *accidental* causes, to the action of *per se* causes, such as nature and human deliberation.

Keywords

Aristotle, physics, luck, accidental causation, *aporia*

FRANCESCO ARONADIO

LE AZIONI COMPIUTE SOTTO COSTRIZIONE, LE AZIONI "MISTE" E LA NOZIONE DI VOLONTARIETÀ
(*ETH. NIC. G 1*)

Abstract

The interpretation of *Eth. Nic. G 1*, and particularly of the notion of "voluntariness" and "involuntariness" is often distorted by the inappropriate overlap of questions deriving from modern moral philosophy. Firstly, this paper presents the scholarly debate on the topics frequently connected with the Aristotelian concepts of ἐκκousion/ἀκκousion (determinism/indeterminism, mixed acts and dirty hands theory, mixed acts vs. instrumental acts, role of circumstances, etc.). The next step is the analysis of the relevant passages of *Eth. Nic.* through a close examination of the relationship between the notions of "choice" and "voluntariness": what is crucial for the voluntariness of an action is the individuation of the efficient cause. On this basis it is possible to clarify the role and the significance of mixed acts and of other kinds of actions described by Aristotle. Finally, the topics previously displayed are re-examined in order to shed some light on the distortions arising from the adoption of inadequate lens in interpreting ancient texts.

Keywords

Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, voluntariness, choice, mixed acts

JOHN GLUCKER

ARISTOTELIAN REMINISCENCES IN PHILO

Abstract

The first part of this article deals with two cases of what seems to be Aristotelian reminiscences in the works of Philo of Alexandria. A passage in *Quod deterius* and a passage in *De agricultura* show close verbal reminiscences to two passages in Book I of *Nicomachean Ethics*; and a passage in *De migratione Abrahami* shows verbal reminiscences to two passages in Book II. Since it appears from Book V of *De finibus* that Antiochus of Ascalon had already read at least parts of *Nicomachean Ethics*; and the first commentator on the *Ethics*, Aspasius, has clear references to some predecessors who had already read and discussed this work, I argue for the possibility that Philo also read the *Nicomachean Ethics*.

The second part deals with an almost forgotten book review by Jacob Freudenthal, published in 1875, which argues that Philo was familiar with various parts of the Aristotelian *corpus* as we have it. I examine his detailed arguments and conclude that, with all due respect to a great scholar, they do not seem to prove his point.

Keywords

Philo of Alexandria, Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aspasius, Jacob Freudenthal

DIEGO E. MACHUCA

PYRRHONISM, INQUIRY, AND RATIONALITY

Abstract

In this paper, I critically engage with Casey Perin's interpretation of Sextan Pyrrhonism in his recent book, *The Demands of Reason: An Essay on Pyrrhonian Scepticism*. From an approach that is both exegetical and systematic, I explore a number of issues concerning the Pyrrhonist's inquiry into truth, his alleged commitment to the canons of rationality, and his response to the *apraxia* objection.

Keywords

Pyrrhonism, Sextus Empiricus, inquiry, rationality, *apraxia*